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INTRODUCTION
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist's is a book that was
written well ahead of its time-almost seven years, to be precise.
Written in 1992, Grand Inquests explores the backgrounds, details, historical contexts, and constitutional significance of the
two most important Senate impeachment trials in the nineteenth
century-those of Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase in 1805
and President Andrew Johnson in 1868. Presumably, Chief Justice Rehnquist expected at the time that he published the book
that the topic would be a safe one for a sitting chief justice, for it
would then have seemed highly unlikely that no similar such trial
would have been on the horizon during the Chief Justice's tenure or lifetime. Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist could have reasonably expected that he could write about the Chase and Johnson impeachment trials without ever having to confront the
issues involved in them (or like proceedings) in his formal capacity.
We now know that Chief Justice Rehnquist's interest in impeachment was prescient. The book became enormously significant when, almost seven years after its publication, the House of
Representatives impeached President William Jefferson Clinton
for perjury and obstruction of justice on December 19, 1998, and
in January and February of 1999, the United States Senate conducted an impeachment trial of President Clinton with none
other than Chief Justice William Rehnquist presiding. The
House's impeachment and the Senate's trial of President Clinton
understandably renewed interest in Chief Justice Rehnquist's
I. Chief Justice of the United States.Supreme Court.
2. Professor of Law, The College of William and Mary. I am enormously grateful
to Michael Stokes-Paulsen for his thoughtful comments on an earlier draft and patience
and support throughout the completion of this essay.
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book-indeed, the book had been out-of-print up until the eve
of President Clinton's impeachment trial, at which time it was
rushed into re-issue as a paperback. There was renewed interest
in the book, not just for the details of and the Chief Justice's
thoughts about two of our most important impeachment precedents-including the only other presidential impeachment
trial-but also for insights into the Chief Justice's disposition
towards the role that he would perform in President Clinton's
impeachment trial as the presiding officer.
Grand Inquests is significant both for what it discusses and
illuminates and for what it does not discuss about the federal
impeachment process. Part I briefly examines the ways in which
the book surveys (and in doing so satisfies contemporary readers' interest in) the most significant congressional impeachment
experiences in the nineteenth century. Part II briefly examines
the ways in which readers' expectations might be frustrated by
the Chief Justice's failures (thoroughly understandable in light of
what he could not have foreseen) to discuss several issues that as
it turns out link President Clinton's impeachment trial to, as well
as differentiate it from, the Chase and Johnson impeachment trials. Part III sketches some likely explanations for and lessons to
be drawn from President's Clinton's impeachment and acquittal,
particularly those that are similar to or reaffirmations of the consequences of the Chase and Johnson impeachment proceedings.
I

To bring the Senate impeachment trials of Justice Chase
and President Johnson to life, Chief Justice Rehnquist discusses
in some detail the personalities of the key figures in the Senate
proceedings, the nature of the controversies giving rise to the
impeachments of both Chase and Johnson, the legal strategies of
those seeking and those opposing the removals of Chase and
Johnson, and the reasons for and significance of the acquittals of
both Chase and Johnson. These details help to familiarize the
uninitiated or the "nonlawyer" -the intended audience of the
book (p. 11)-with these important historical events.
To understand the significance of the Chase and Johnson
impeachment trials, one needs to appreciate, as Chief Justice
Rehnquist explains, how the two trials were inseparable from the
political issues dividing the major political parties of the times.
The Chase trial, for instance, turned on whether in overseeing
the sedition trials of two prominent critics of Federalist policy,
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Associate Justice Chase, an ardent Federalist, conducted himself
'"in a manner highly arbitrary, oppressive, and unjust,"' motivated, at least according to the justice's critics and political opponents (and, of course, the House Managers who were trying to
remove him from office), by the base political desire to abuse his
judicial authority in an effort to do harm to vigorous political
foes over whose sedition trials Chase presided. (p. 59)
The Johnson trial also featured an impeachment effort
masking a thinly veiled effort to remove an unelected, unpopular
president (Johnson had become president only as a result of the
assassination of Abraham Lincoln), who time and time again
had-at least in the opinion of the Radical Republicans in
charge of Congress at the time-tried to substitute his personal
will and beliefs about appropriate Reconstruction policy for that
of Congress. The Radical Republicans in Congress had wanted
to tie the re-entry of Southern states into the Union on granting
certain rights (such as the vote) to the newly freed slaves, while
Johnson, a Democrat from the South, had wanted to deny the
vote to African-Americans and effect greater leniency towards
and preserve the authority of the popularly elected officials of
those southern governments. This contest of wills between
Johnson and the Reconstruction Congress had provoked a couple of unsuccessful efforts by the House to impeach Johnson;
(pp. 208-212) but eventually the House successfully impeached
Johnson based on his dismissal of his Secretary of War, Edwin
Stanton, a Radical Republican, in apparent violation of the formal requirement to get Senate approval prior to ordering such
termination as set forth in the Tenure in Office Act, an act which
Congress had passed (like so much other Reconstruction legislation) over Johnson's veto. Johnson had vetoed the Tenure in
Office Act because he believed it illegitimately impeded the
President's prerogative to control the exercise of executive
power by removing executive officers as he saw fit. Moreover,
President Johnson viewed the act as inapplicable to his firing of
Stanton, because he construed the act as applying only to a
president's removal of cabinet officials whom he had initially
nominated (Lincoln, not Johnson, had nominated Stanton).
However, the Radical Republicans in Congress intensely disagreed with Johnson over the constitutionality and the construction of the act.
Historians have speculated a good bit about the reasons for
the Senate's acquittals of both Justice Chase and President Johnson. Some of the more interesting portions of Grand Inquests
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include the Chief Justice's speculations about the reasons for
each impeached official's acquittal. A majority of the Senatebut not a supermajority-did vote to convict and remove Justice
Chase. Chief Justice Rehnquist explains the latter vote partly on
the basis of "the personality and character of John Randolph,"
one of the most zealous of the House Managers who sought
Chase's removal from office. (p. 110) Prior to Chase's trial,
Randolph had alienated many Republican senators through his
zealous, often personal attacks upon those who disagreed with
him, including the President at the time of the Chase impeachment, Thomas Jefferson. (Jefferson had encouraged the impeachment of Samuel Chase, an ardent Federalist critic of Jefferson's administration.) Several senators made their antipathy
for Randolph known to their colleagues during Chase's trial, (p.
113) and Rehnquist surmises that "Republican senators might
view with considerably less enthusiasm the case against Chase
when the managers were led by John Randolph than they would
have viewed the same case if the managers had been led by a less
mercurial and erratic champion."3 (Id. at 113). Rehnquist
speculates further that "one should not rule out statesmanship of
a high order as the motivating factor in the case of some Republican senators who voted to acquit. The Federalist senators, who
to a man voted 'Not Guilty,' were convinced that the impeachment proceedings were a partisan attack by the Republicans on
the independence of the federal judiciary-the branch of government that was in the hands of Federalist appointees ....
[P]erhaps to some Republicans the demonstrated misconduct of
Chase ... would have been grounds for removal only if it could
have been accomplished consistently with the maintenance of an
independent judiciary; thinking that it could not be, they accepted Chase's continuance in office as the lesser of two evils."
(p. 113)
Chief Justice Rehnquist also gives several reasons for President Johnson's acquittal. Indeed, Johnson was acquitted by the
thinnest of margins-a single vote. Chief Justice Rehnquist's
explanations are based on his review of a wide variety of historical materials relating to the trial, including written opinions
submitted in explanation of their votes by 30 of the 54 senators
who participated in Johnson's trial. (p. 240) Chief Justice

3. Interestingly, one might see here a possible foreshadowing of a problem in
President Ointon's impeachment trial, in which some senators were turned off by what
they regarded as the over-heated, over-stated rhetoric of some of the House Managers.
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Rehnquist suggests that senators acquitted because, inter alia,
some of them disliked the person who would have succeeded to
the presidency if Johnson were to have been removed, the Senate Pro Tern Benjamin Butler, even more than they disliked
Johnson;4 some senators did not believe Johnson's misconduct
constituted an impeachable offense; other senators believed
Johnson was entitled to a good faith belief that the Tenure in Office Act did not apply to his removal of Stanton (for it applied
only to the removals of people whom a president had nominated
to confirmable office and Stanton had been nominated by Lincoln, not Johnson); and Johnson had signaled to senators that he
would accept congressional primacy in fashioning Reconstruction. (pp. 240-47) Moreover, "the tactics of the managers from
beginning to end undoubtedly antagonized not only senators
who were doubtful to begin with but some who leaned toward
conviction at the beginning of the Senate trial." (p. 247). These
tactics (including, inter alia, waving a bloody shirt on the Senate
floor and urging senators to "vote as you shot") included, inter
alia, "appeal[ling] to every prejudice and passion, and r[iding]
roughshod, when they could, over legal obstacles in their ruthless attempt to punish the President for his opposition to their
plans." (p. 247, citation omitted)
Of even greater interest to modem readers than some senators' stated or suspected reasons for acquitting Chase and Johnson is the constitutional significance of the two acquittals in
Chief Justice Rehnquist's estimation. According to Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Chase's acquittal had a "profound effect on the
American judiciary" for two reasons. (p. 114) First, he suggests,
"it assured the independence of federal judges from congressional oversight of the decisions they made in the cases that
came before them. Second, by assuring that impeachment would
not be used in the future as a method to remove members of the
Supreme Court for their judicial opinions, it helped to safeguard
the independence of that body." (Id.)
Chief Justice Rehnquist is much more careful in pronouncing his opinion on the significance of President Johnson's impeachment by the House and acquittal by the Senate. Johnson's
acquittal was no sure thing; it turned on the courage of seven
Republican senators to buck their party and short-term political
interests and vote for acquittal-indeed, all seven would eventu4. During Johnon's presidency there was no formal mechanism for filing nor addressing a vacancy in the vice-presidency.
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ally abandon or lose their seats. Chief Justice Rehnquist observes that President Johnson's impeachment reflected the
strong resolve of Radical Republicans "to make the South pay a
high price for its effort to dissolve the Union by force and to use
the power of the federal government to aid the newly freed
slaves"; (p. 250) Johnson's succession to the presidency by
means of assassination rather than popular election or support;
the fact that "both houses of Congress were controlled by the
Republican party, to whose policies he was opposed"; (p. 251)
and the strong "determination on the part of [the President and
Congress] to insist on what [each] regarded as its institutional
prerogatives. Johnson resolutely vetoed measures he felt were
either wrong or unconstitutional, and he used his power of appointment to reward his friends. Congress retaliated by passing
laws over his veto, and by enacting measures, such as the Tenure
in Office Act ... , designed to limit the president's power of removal." (p. 251)
Chief Justice Rehnquist concludes further that, had Johnson
not been acquitted, his conviction would have transformed impeachment into just another one of the many methods available
to the Congress (such as its oversight authority over appropriations or appointments) to "frustrate the president in his effort to
carry out his program." (p. 270) In the Chief Justice's view, "the
greatest significance of such [a transformation] for impeachment
would have been its usefulness simply as a threat-a sword of
Damocles, designed not to fall but to hang ... Future presidents
of one party facing a Congress controlled by the opposite party
[would have to] think twice about vetoing bills with which they
disagreed, and about resisting the inevitable efforts by Congress
to poach on the executive domain." (Id.) Thus, for Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the acquittal of President Johnson confirms that:
Impeachment would not be a referendum on the public official's performance in office; instead, it would be a judicial
type of inquiry in which specific charges were made by the
House of Representatives, evidence was received before the
Senate, and the senators would decide whether or not the
charges were proven. The Johnson acquittal added another
requirement ... It was not any technical violation of the law
that would suffice, but it was the sort of violation of the law
that would in itself justify removal from office .... With respect to the chief executive, [the acquittal has meant] that as
to the policies he sought to pursue, he would be answerable
only to the country as a whole in the quadrennial presidential
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elections, and not to Congress through the process of impeachment. (p. 271)

II

For anyone familiar with the history of congressional impeachment practices, it should not be surprising to find in the
Chase and Johnson impeachment trials the seeds of some of the
issues that came to characterize or dominate the impeachment
and trial of President William Jefferson Clinton. Chief Justice
Rehnquist touches on only a few ofthese in his book. He should
not be faulted for not having foreseen more of these issues.
Many of the issues that have preoccupied contemporary observers and commentators, such as the constitutionality of a so-called
"finding of fact" or the possibility of a judicial challenge to certain aspects of impeachment proceedings, were simply not part
of the impeachment process or on people's minds at the time of
the historic events at the center of Rehnquist's book. After all,
the Chief Justice's book is a work of history, not a primer for or
treatise on presidential impeachment trials. Nevertheless, the
very fact that Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote his book without
the present circumstances in mind raises reasonable curiosity
about whether he was able to foresee or offer some dispassionate insight into some of the issues that would arise in the proceedings against President Clinton. The book does not offer
much discussion of these issues, but it does, if one reads it carefully, offer some useful background material.
Take, for example, Chief Justice Rehnquist's assessment of
the significance of the Chase acquittal. He copiously recounts
the histories of efforts to use the federal impeachment process
against presidents and federal judges prior to the Johnson and
Chase impeachment trials, respectively, but he does not offer
much of an account of the history of federal impeachment efforts
after those trials (with the notable exception of analyzing the
three articles of impeachment approved by the House Judiciary
Committee against President Richard Nixon, whose removal
from office Chief Justice Rehnquist considers to have been inevitable). (pp. 272-74) The Chief Justice regards Justice Chase's
acquittal as cementing the congressional mind-set against using
impeachment to punish federal judges or Supreme Court justices
for their official decisions, but he fails to note that subsequent to
the Chase acquittal the primary targets of federal impeachment
efforts have been federal judges. He also does not suggest any-
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thing at all about the competency of members of either the
House or the Senate to render informed or principled judgments
about impeachment, an issue that has arisen more than once
since the nineteenth century. For instance, in the aftermath of
the three late 1980s judicial impeachment trials, some commentators (including some senators) raised serious questions about
whether senators had the interest, time, or inclination to participate meaningfully in the impeachment trials of lower court federal judges. Indeed, in the early 1990s Congress authorized the
creation of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and
Removal to study, inter alia, the propriety of continuing vesting
of the constitutional authority of impeachment and removal in
Congress. (The Commission concluded that on balance it made
sense to keep the division of authority regarding impeachment
within the politically accountable authorities in which the framers placed it.)
Nor did Chief Justice Rehnquist discuss the interesting
question whether the standards for impeaching federal judges
(or justices) and presidents should be the same. This issue was
on the minds of many of the members of Congress throughout
the impeachment proceedings against President Clinton, because
the articles of impeachment approved by the House against him
included one charge-perjury-that had served successfully as
the basis for removing at least two federal judges in the late
1980s-Alcee Hastings and Walter Nixon. Moreover, a third
federal district judge, Harry Claiborne, had been impeached and
removed from office in 1986 based on income tax evasion (obviously a crime involving a form of lying under oath). Members of
Congress in the nineteenth century certainly did consider the
kinds of legal violation that would constitute an appropriate basis for impeachment, but there is little record of any explicit discussion of the comparable standards for impeaching federal
judges (or justices) and presidents.
One reason for this relative silence might have been that the
charges against Justice Chase and President Johnson turned to a
significant degree on their different responsibilities-in Chase's
case, those of a federal judge in overseeing trials while those
against Johnson turned on his duties to comply with a civil law
directed at the President but that, in Johnson's opinion, either
did not apply in the circumstances of his firing of Stanton or, if it
did, was unconstitutional. The very fact that members of Congress did not fret much, if at all, about the degree to which the
standards for impeaching justices and presidents were the same
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or different is telling; it reflects an important theme that has run
throughout impeachment history-that impeachment primarily
exists for dealing with serious abuses of power or privilege and
thus is likely to differ to the extent that officials' different responsibilities have been involved or implicated in any given impeachment proceeding. The point is that the standard for impeachment might be the same for all officials (i.e., "other high
crimes and misdemeanors"), but it might be applied differently,
depending on the context in which misconduct has arisen and the
particular responsibilities allegedly abused by the particular official involved.
Chief Justice Rehnquist does not discuss several other questions that intrigue contemporary observers of the impeachment
process. These questions include, inter alia, whether the House
should function something like a grand jury in an impeachment
proceeding. The Chief Justice did not explicitly address this issue, though it seems that implicit within his conception of the
House's responsibility as including the formulation of specific
charges against an impeached official might well be something
like a grand jury or prosecutorial function. One thing that cuts
against this conception of the House's role is that President
Clinton's impeachment featured the most extensive discussion
ever in the House of its function within the impeachment process
as tantamount or similar to a grand jury. (Significantly, this contention was made by only a few House Members and was never
formally endorsed by nor articulated by a majority of House
members.) Usually, the House has conducted its own, separate
investigation into charges of impeachable misconduct, even in
cases (such as those of Richard Nixon, Harry Claiborne, Alcee
Hastings, and Walter Nixon) referred to the House by some external authority. Regrettably, the Chief Justice did not dwell on
the House's proceedings in impeaching either Chase or Johnson;
consequently, his readers do not come away from the book with
any conception or grounding in how the House, at least in the
nineteenth century, understood its function (in contrast to how it
understood or performed its function on other occasions, including the Clinton impeachment).
The Chief Justice's book is silent on other issues that did
not arise explicitly in any impeachment proceedings prior to the
1970s. Of particular significance is the question of the appropriate burden of proof in the House as well as the Senate. An issue
that arose first in the impeachment inquiry against William 0.
Douglas in 1970 and a few years later against Richard Nixon had
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to do with the degree to which an impeachable official could be
impeached and removed from office for misbehavior not formally nor strictly related to his or her official duties. The House
refused to approve any formal inquiry against Douglas based on
his lifestyle (or, for that matter, on his judicial decisions), confirming the Chief Justice's assessment of the lasting significance
of Chase's acquittal; and the House Judiciary Committee refused
to approve an article of impeachment against Richard Nixon
based on tax fraud. Private misconduct for the first time became
clearly an appropriate basis for impeachment and removal when
the House impeached and the Senate removed Harry Claiborne
from his federal district judgeship in 1986 for tax evasion. Claiborne's impeachment helped to blur the line between the public
and the private, such that President Clinton's misconduct became, in the view of many, fair game for impeachment andremoval from office.
Another recent development that has become important to
the impeachment process, but that did not figure into either the
Chase or Johnson impeachments, has had to do with the innovations made by the Twelfth Amendment (which arguably helped
to transform the President into a popularly elected official as
opposed to one that had been primarily chosen by the Electoral
College) and Seventeenth Amendment (which changed the way
in which Senators were elected, from being chosen by their respective state legislatures to the citizenry of their respective
states). No doubt, the degree to which these amendments have
made all federal officials directly accountable to the electorate
has introduced a dynamic into the federal impeachment process
that did not make any difference to the outcomes of the Chase
and Johnson impeachment efforts. In contrast, Richard Nixon
became the first elected president to have been subjected to a
serious impeachment inquiry, while William Jefferson Clinton
became the first elected president to have been formally impeached. In their defenses, both presidents raised the arguments
that their respective popular elections should not be lightly overturned nor disregarded in the impeachment process. Indeed,
President Clinton was able to muster high popularity ratings that
undoubtedly helped to put pressure on senators not just to acquit the President but also to end his trial as quickly as possible.
President Clinton's trial dramatically illustrated some of the
ways (which I explore in more detail in Part III} in which the
Twelfth and Seventeenth Amendments have made senators
more sensitive to the electorate's preferences.
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Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist does not discuss the
constitutionality or significance of censure in his book. This is a
little surprising, because censure was very much a nineteenth
century phenomenon, though it seems to have fallen out of
vogue in the twentieth century. Interestingly, the House of Representatives passed resolutions (in one form or another) that
censured, rebuked, or reprimanded Presidents John Tyler, James
Polk, and James Buchanan, while the Senate censured (but later
expunged the resolution against) President Andrew Jackson.
(This is not to mention almost a dozen other resolutions passed
by the House or the Senate critical in some fashion of other
high-ranking governmental officials.) As Congress's devices for
checking presidential (and other high-ranking officials) missteps
have grown, the need for censure seems to have diminished. In
addition, the eventual expungement of President Jackson's censure demonstrated to some its futility as a measure of lasting rebuke. Nevertheless, censure was a meaningful alternative to impeachment for many members of Congress (particularly
Democrats) throughout the impeachment proceedings against
President Clinton, and any sequel to Chief Justice Rehnquist's
book will have to address the arguments made for and against
censure in President Clinton's impeachment proceedings
Of course, one cannot leave a discussion of Chief Justice
Rehnquist's book without considering whether and, if so, how he
would figure as a character in any sequel. No doubt, he will not
write it. Just as he has avoided any extra-judicial commentary
on his function as an associate justice and a chief justice, he will
in all likelihood avoid writing about his own performance as the
second chief justice to have presided over a presidential impeachment trial. As the presiding officer in President Clinton's
presidential impeachment trial, Chief Justice Rehnquist demonstrated a great sensitivity to adhering to and respecting Senate
procedures and precedents. No one understood better than the
Chief Justice that the impeachment trial was the Senate's to
conduct as it saw fit. Thus, he helped in his own way to confirm
one of the most important lessons that he has identified as having been initially established in the nineteenth century grand inquests-that the Senate has by virtue of its complete authority to
structure and conduct impeachment trials as it sees fit the opportunity to vindicate or defend constitutional principles that are as
important to defining the relations between the branches as any
opinion rendered by the other court over which the Chief Justice
presides.
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III
Perhaps the most important question raised by Grand Inquests is whether the lessons the Chief Justice has identified as
lying at the heart of past grand inquests have helped to guide the
present generation through its most recent grand inquest. The
answer, at least tentatively, seems to be only to a limited degree.
In the more than hundred years after the impeachment trial of
President Andrew Johnson, impeachments have not realized the
kinds of dangers that Chief Justice Rehnquist foresaw as possibly resulting from the conviction of President Johnson. Nevertheless, in the past 25 years, this nation has witnessed more serious impeachment proceedings attempts-at least six-than it has
experienced in any other comparable (25-year) period in our history.5 Indeed, of the six attempts initiated in this 25-year period,
the President has been the subject of two.
Explaining President Clinton's impeachment and acquittal
in light of the American experience with grand inquests is no
simple task. Here I can only begin to sketch some possible explanations for the event. For instance, as Chief Justice
Rehnquist did with respect to President Johnson's acquittal, one
could explain the outcome in President Clinton's impeachment
trial in terms of the stated reasons that senators have given for
casting their acquittal votes. The most serious problem with relying on such statements is that not all senators produced them.
Only 72 senators published such statements. These 72 included
only 34 of the 45 Democratic senators who voted not guilty on
both articles of impeachment, 4 of the 5 Republicans who voted
not guilty on both impeachment articles, and 3 of the 5 Republicans who voted not guilty on the first but guilty on the second
article of impeachment. Of those 39 senators who published
statements on their reasons for voting not guilty on both articles,
more than half-27-explained that they did not regard the misconduct alleged in either article of impeachment approved by
the House as constituting an impeachable offense.6 Sixteen of
5. The six officials were Presidents Nixon and Ointon and former judges Henry
Oaibome, Walter Nixon, Alcee Hastings, and Robert Collins. Three of these officials
(Oaibome, Walter Nixon, and Hastings) were formally impeached and removed from
office; two (Richard Nixon and Robert Collins) resigned from office before being formally impeached; and only one (President Ointon) was acquitted.
6. See Published Oosed-Door Statements of Senators Akaka, Boxer, Biden,
Breaux, Bryan, Oeland, Collins, Dorgan, Durbin, Graham, Harkin, Hollings, Jeffords,
Johnson, Kennedy, Kerry, Kohl, Lincoln, Leahy, Lieberman, Levin, Mikulski, Moynihan,
Reid, Sarbanes, Snowe, Wellstone, and Wyden (all released into the Congressional Record on February 12, 1999).
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the 39-all Democrats-explained that the Republicans' partisanship in conducting the impeachment proceedings in the
House affected their votes,7 while fourteen (joined by Republican Arlen Specter) explained that the House Managers had not8
proven the misconduct alleged in either article of impeachment.
Two Republican senators indicated that they had voted not
guilty on the first article of impeachment (and guilty on the second article) even though they believed that all charges against
the President had been proven,9 while another Republican senator, Fred Thompson, explained that he had voted not guilty on
the first article (but guilty on the second) based on his belief that
the former was impossible to defend against because it was
vague and did not specify the statements in which the President
had allegedly perjured himself. 10
These numbers hardly tell the full story of the President's
impeachment and acquittal. Consequently, one could try to explain the event further in partisan terms. Notably, all 35 votes to
convict the President on the first article and all 50 votes to convict him on the second article were cast by Republicans. Over
95% of the votes cast in the House to impeach the President
were cast by Republicans. Yet, Senate Democrats arguably
acted in at least as partisan a fashion as did the Republicans. At
the outset of the impeachment trial, it was clear that if the 45
Senate Democrats were to vote as or close to a block in opposition to the President's removal it would be numerically impossible for him to be convicted. In fact, no Democratic senator
bolted from his or her party to vote for either article of im7. See Published Oosed-Door Statements of Senators Akaka, Biden, Boxer,
Bryan, Dodd, Dorgan, Durbin, Harkin, Hollings, Kennedy, Lautenberg, Leahy, Moynihan, Sarbanes, Wellstone, and Wyden (released into the Congressional Record on February 12, 1999).
8. See Published Statements of Senators Akaka, Biden, Dodd, Durbin, Edwards,
Feingold, Kennedy, Lautenberg, Levin, Mikulski, Murray, Rockefeller, Sarbanes, Specter, and Wyden (released into the Congressional Record on February 12, 1999). Senator
Robb explained that he voted not guilty on the first article, because he did not believe
that the House Managers had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the President had
committed perjury in his grand jury testimony; but he voted not guilty on the second article because it illegitimately bundled so many charges together that defending against it
was a virtual impossibility. In Senator Robb's opinion, the second article was drafted in
such a way to allow at least two-thirds of the Senate to vote in favor of it though most
would have disagreed over the specific misconduct for which they were voting to remove
the President. See Published Statement of Senator Charles Robb (released into the
Congressional Record on February 12, 1999).
9. See Published Oosed-Door Statements of Senators Gorton and Stevens (released into the Congressional Record on Feb. 12, 1999).
10. See Fred Thompson, Senate Trial of Clinton Is Over, and It's Time to Move On,
Knoxville News-Sentinel (Feb. 15, 1999), available at 1999 WL 9155314.

446

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 16:433

peachment, while ten bolted from the Republican contingent to
vote against the first article and five Republicans voted against
the second article of impeachment.
Yet another possible explanation for the President's acquittal is the unprecedented impact of the public and the media on
the impeachment proceedings. First, the Clinton impeachment
proceedings are the first in which the public's preferences helped
to drive the final outcome. Throughout the President's impeachment trial, his approval ratings held steady at or near
67%.u Similarly, a majority of Americans throughout the proceedings steadily opposed the President's removal from office.
(In contrast, the Senate's acquittal of President Johnson opposed
the public's preferences.) Yet, more than 70% of the American
people believe that the President was guilty of the misconduct
charged in the first article; 12 and 67% believe that he had violated various laws. 13 These statistics can be reconciled on the
ground that, as one poll found, 76% of the American people believe that the case against the President involved purely private
misconduct that should not have been made the basis for his impeachment.14 Another poll found most of the public did notregard the charges made against the President as constituting appropriate grounds for his removal. 15 In other words, most of the
public did not regard the President's as constituting impeachable
misconduct. The Democrats' steady opposition to the President's removal plainly followed the preferences of most Americans.
Moreover, the media's coverage might have had four effects
on the public (or at least the 61% of the public that regularly
followed the hearings) and, through public opinion, on the
members of Congress. First, it might have served as a constant
reminder to the public as well as members of Congress, particularly senators, of the House Managers' difficulty of arguing convincingly that the President had breached the public trust-a
II.

See, e.g., Mark

z.

Barabak, The Times Poll, The Los Angeles Times Al (Jan.

31, 1999).
12. See Josh Getlin, The Truce Behind the Culture Wars; Values: Shrill Clinton De-

bate Drowns Out Broad American Consensus on Most Issues, The Los Angeles Times Al
(Feb. 7, 1999) (reporting the finding of a "recent" USA Today/CNN poll that 79% of the
public "believed the president committed perjury"), available at 1999 WL 2127851.
13. ld.
14. Id.
15. Kenneth T. Wald, et al., The Price of Victory, U.S. News & World Report 26
(Feb. 22, 1999) (reporting that 55%'of those polled did not believe Ointon's behavior
was serious enough to warrant his removal from office).
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classic prerequisite for impeachment-as long as the public did
not regard its trust with the President as having been breached.
Second, the media's constant airing of bashing of the President's
integrity throughout his presidency (particularly for the more
than nine months that preceded the formal impeachment inquiry
against the President) might have lowered the public's expectations regarding the President's integrity. New allegations of
presidential misconduct would not have surprised much of the
public nor shifted its basic opinion of the President. Third, the
media's obsession with finding the next Watergate might have
increased the public's skepticism over the likelihood that the impeachment proceedings against the President had uncovered it.
The rhetoric with which the media characterized every new
scandal of the Clinton White House-Filegate, Travelgate,
MonicaGate, Koreagate, Whitewater-had been phrased to
liken President Clinton's scandals to those of Richard Nixon, but
the public found the comparisons wanting. The repeated attempts to liken the President's scandals to Watergate, particularly before full investigations had been launched, might have
led much of the public to conclude that the President's harshest
critics and the proponents of his impeachment were akin to the
boy who cried wolf. Fourth, the media's comprehensive coverage might simply have bored the public. Prolonging the hearings
held little, if any, prospect that anything new would happen. In
virtually every poll, the vast majority of Americans indicated
that they were sick and tired of the trial by the time it was over.
As reported by the media (and reflected in phone calls, faxes,
and e-mail to members of Congress), the public's exasperation if
not boredom with the trial, coupled with the public's steady opposition to removal of the President, intensified pressure to end
the hearings.
As one moves from possible explanations for the President's
impeachment and acquittal to the likely lessons that will be
drawn from the experience, the focus of the inquiry shifts. In
analyzing both Justice Chase's and President Johnson's impeachments and acquittals, Chief Justice Rehnquist took this
step in his book. This step requires a shift in focus from relying
primarily on empirical data to determining how subsequent generations, particularly subsequent congresses, have understood
the significance of each previous grand inquest. Obviously, we
can only speculate about the range of possible lessons or consequences of the President's impeachment and acquittal, based on
some of the spin that already is being applied to the event (by
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those for and against the President's removal) and the consequences that roughly similar events have had in the past. It of
course remains to be seen which lessons will withstand the test of
time and which consequences do in fact arise.
First, the Democrats' uniform opposition to the President's
conviction highlights the enormous difficulty (if not the impossibility) of securing a conviction in a presidential impeachment
trial as long as the senators from the President's party unanimously stand by him. Rarely does a political party dominate
more than two-thirds of the seats in the Senate. Hence, the solidity of the Democratic ranks in President Clinton's impeachment trial dramatically illustrated that removal of a president is
possible only if the misconduct is sufficiently compelling to draw
support from both sides of the aisle for a conviction. In the absence of bipartisan support for removal, acquittal is virtually
guaranteed. (The likelihood of this result is also a consequence
of the constitutional requirement that at least two-thirds of the
Senate must vote to convict in order for a removal to occur. The
supermajority requirement makes conviction and removal highly
unlikely, for it is no easy task to get such a high degree of consensus among senators, particularly when the stakes are so high.
When such consensus is achieved, it is likely to be the result of a
very compelling and credible case for conviction and removal.)
Second, the President's acquittal might have shown that impeachment is not an effective check against the misconduct of a
popular president. It is quite feasible that the President's acquittal might have the consequence of leaving subsequent generations uncertain as to whether Congress will have the resolve in
any future impeachment proceeding against a president with
high approval ratings. The congressional investigation into Watergate took more than two years, before the "smoking gun"the tapes of certain conversations in the White House-that led
to President Nixon's resignation was discovered. 16 The Clinton impeachment trial took only a month, and the entire impeachment
proceedings against President Clinton are among the shortest in
history (with the shortest being Harry Claiborne's in 1986, lasting only four months from start to finish). Even so, that was too
long for most people. While it is true that most people did not
believe President Clinton's case involved legitimately impeachable offenses, some investigations might not uncover seriously
16. See generally Stanley I. Kutler, The Wars of Watergate: The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon 187-527 (Knopf, 1990).
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problematic misconduct (insofar as the public is concerned) for
some time. Future congresses might think twice before engaging
in a relatively prolonged investigation of a President's misconduct, for fear that it might alienate the public. (In this respect,
the Clinton impeachment proceedings could be viewed as
strengthening rather than weakening the office of the presidency.) The Clinton impeachment proceedings raise a question
about just how serious the misconduct of a popular president
must be to convince a majority of Americans to support removing him from office. It is possible that impeachment will be effective only for the kinds of misconduct that can galvanize the
public to set aside its approval of a president's performance to
support resignation or formal removal. Indeed, a future Congress might support removal only if it has direct evidence of very
serious wrongdoing and unambiguous consensus (in Congress
and among the public) on the gravity of such wrongdoing.
Third, President Clinton's impeachment proceedings might
have underscored the greater vulnerability to impeachment and
removal of those officials who lack a president's resources or
popularity. It is conceivable that an unpopular president such as
Andrew Johnson might meet a different fate in an age in which
the media constantly applies pressure to investigate a president's
misconduct (or conduct that has made him unpopular) and in
which polls indicate widespread popular support for removal. In
this circumstance, removal or resignation might be extremely
likely. (To date, the only instance like this occurred during the
final days of Richard Nixon's presidency, when the public for the
first and only time during the Watergate investigation expressed
support for the President's ouster based on information revealed
in the Watergate tapes.) The dynamic is likely to be even more
problematic for a federal judge, including a Supreme Court justice, whose hearings are not likely to get anything near the widespread media coverage that President Clinton's proceedings got,
nor the outpouring of public support (or the public's opposition
to the prolongation of hearings). In the absence of these factors,
a federal judge or other low-profile official simply lacks the resources available to a president (particularly a popular one) in
defending against political retaliation in the form of an impeachment.
Fourth, the Clinton impeachment proceedings serve as a
dramatic reminder that the burden in an impeachment proceeding is on the advocates or proponents of impeachment to show
that the charges have not been based on nor motivated by parti-
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sanship.
No doubt, a proponent of President Clinton's impeachment and removal might argue the charges were not based
on partisanship but rather the needs to protect the integrity of
the judicial system and to ensure the President's compliance with
his oath of office (even in a civil lawsuit whose focus in unrelated
to his official duties). Yet, those charging Justice Chase and
President Johnson with impeachable misconduct argued the very
same thing; they claimed that the charges against those officials
were based on those officials' respective abuse of authority and
not on partisanship. Ultimately, those seeking the removals of
President Johnson and Justice Chase failed to carry their burdens (for a critical mass of senators and for posterity). Similarly,
those seeking President Clinton's removal from office have
failed (thus far) to convince most Americans (as well as any
Democrat in the Senate) that their charges against the President
were not based on nor motivated to a significant degree by partisan dislike for the President.
The latter failure increases the likelihood that subsequent
generations will not look kindly upon the House's judgment to
impeach President Clinton. As I have indicated, there were
similar failures with respect to Chase's and Johnson's impeachment, and the majority vote cast in favor of convicting both officials did not preclude either's impeachment from being subsequently viewed as lacking political legitimacy by subsequent
generations and congresses. Johnson's and Chase's acquittals
have each had the effect of dissuading subsequent congresses
from bringing or initiating impeachments based on similar misconduct. Subsequent congresses have been able to take such
postures in part because the outcomes in Chase's and Johnson's
trials did not turn on disputes about the underlying facts. Virtually everyone at the time agreed on the facts, but they disagreed
over the significance of the facts. Unencumbered with having to
resolve factual disputes, subsequent generations (and congresses) have been free to provide their own assessments of the
legal and constitutional significance of the facts (and thus of
Chase's and Johnson's misconduct). They have concluded that
the misconduct targeted in each impeachment did not warrant
removal from office. 18
17. See Federalist 65 (Hamilton) in Garry Wills, ed., The Federalist Papers 381-82
(Bantam 1987).
18. To be sure, the historical version as set forth in Chief Justice Rehnquist's book
of the significance of President Johnson's impeachment as a thoroughly partisan effort by
some members of Congress to increase congressional power at the expense of the presi-
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By similar reasoning, the Clinton acquittal could be construed by subsequent Congresses as a rejection of the House's
judgment on the impeachability of the President's misconduct.
For one thing, the vote to impeach the President was (as it was in
Chase's and Johnson's cases) largely cast along party lines, while
there has been relatively widespread perception (at least among
the public) that the proceedings generally were conducted and
resolved on partisan grounds. 19 Moreover, most people (including most members of Congress) do not disagree much, if at all,
about the underlying facts in President Clinton's case; they disagree over the legal significance of the facts. Subsequent congresses might conclude that if such misconduct could not merit a
conviction in one case (i.e., Clinton's), it would be inconsistent
or unfair to allow it to become the basis for a conviction in another case. In addition, subsequent members of Congress could
conclude that if a majority vote by the Senate to convict both
Chase and Johnson could not save either's impeachment from
being regarded as illegitimate, the absence of a majority vote in
the Senate for either article of impeachment against President
Clinton (coupled with other criticisms of it) could be viewed as
an even rounder rejection of the legitimacy of the House's case
than were the Senate votes in Chase's and Johnson's trials.
Perhaps one of the most important consequences of President Clinton's impeachment and trial is that it affirmed the
House's and the Senate's final, nonreviewable discretion to conduct its respective impeachment proceedings. In the course of
President Clinton's impeachment proceedings, both the House
and the Senate followed the holding in Nixon v. United States, 20
in which the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that challenges
dency is not one on which all historians would agree. For instance, Michael Les
Benedict, in his well-regarded study of the Johnson impeachment, suggested that the ef·
fort to impeach and remove Johnson from office was not necessarily illegitimate because
of Johnson's repeated violations of statutes that had been passed by the Congress over
his veto and Johnson's efforts to weaken the enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Michael Les Benedict, The Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson (Norton, 1973). Nevertheless, the understanding of the constitutional significance of Johnson's acquittal, as reflected in Grand Inquests, probably remains the dominant historical
understanding of the event. Perhaps more importantly, it was the understanding that
most members of Congress indicated that they had during the Ointon trial, an understanding that obviously helped to shape these members' understanding of impeachment
generally.
19. See, e.g., Hotline (Feb. 16, 1999) (reporting that ABC had determined 71% of
the public believed "that Senators based their votes on partisan politics rather than facts"
and that other news devices had made similar findings), available at Westlaw 2/16199
APN-H040).
20. 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993).
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to the constitutionality of Senate impeachment trial procedures
are nonjusticiable. The Court left to the Senate the final, nomeviewable authority to devise impeachment trial procedures as it
saw fit. Consequently, the House and the Senate took great liberties in fashioning their respective impeachment proceedings
against President Clinton as each saw fit. For example, in relatively controversial decisions, the House decided (for only the
third time in history) not to call any live witnesses or otherwise
undertake any independent fact-finding, 21 to hold a final vote on
the impeachment articles in a lame duck session,22 and to forego
21. The first instance in American history in which the House did not take any live
testimony or undertake independent fact-finding was the House's impeachment of President Johnson. This parallel between the Qinton and Johnson proceedings undercuts the
characterization of the House's action as primarily or largely nonpartisan. For the Johnson impeachment remains widely regarded as one of the most partisan in history and thus
serves as a dubious precedent for the Ointon impeachment to have followed.
Moreover, the House Judiciary Committee's decision to forego such live testimony
in its investigation of President Qinton contrasts with the widely respected move by the
House Judiciary Committee in its investigation of President Nixon's misconduct to take
live testimony from nine witnesses behind closed doors, even though a special prosecutor
had referred evidentiary materials to the committee. The deviation from the latter
precedent in President Qinton's case is another move by the House Judiciary Committee
that provided a useful basis for attack by the President's defenders on the neutrality of
the House's proceedings.
The only other instance in which the House failed to undertake any independent
fact-finding prior to impeaching an official was its impeachment of Harry Qaibome (referred to the House by the Judicial Conference of the United States). Judge Qaibome
agreed to forego fact-finding by the House to hasten his impeachment by the House and
what he expected would be a full trial (and ultimate vindication) in the Senate.
22. In his testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, Yale Law Professor
Bruce Ackerman made the provocative argument that by impeaching the President in a
lame duck session the House had violated the Twentieth Amendment. See Impeachment Inquiry: William Jefferson Qinton, President of the United States: Presentation on
Behalf of the President: Hearing before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 105'"
Cong. 37 (1998) (testimony of Bruce Ackerman). The argument got a lot of attention
from the media but won no supporters in Congress. First, the text of the amendment
does not clearly forbid such actions. Second, Professor Ackerman's argument is undercut by the fact that several earlier impeachments (one as recently as 1988-89) had been
carried over from one congress to the next. These two factors led Professor Ackerman to
shift his argument to maintaining (1) that lame duck impeachments are generally a bad
idea and (2) a lame duck impeachment might be legitimate only if, like a piece of legislation passed in an earlier Congress, the House were to reaffirm it in a subsequent congress
prior to the Senate's acting upon it. The second argument is also undercut by the fact
that several impeachment trials involved "carryover" impeachments. Moreover, impeachment is arguably a more complete act than legislation passed only by a single
house. Last but not least, Thomas Jefferson, in his influential manual on parliamentary
practice drafted while he was Vice-President, maintained that the American system followed the British practice in which impeachments carried over from one Parliament to
the next. See Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson's Manual of Parliamentary Practice, Section
620, reprinted in H.R. Doc. 104-272, at 313 (1997). Nevertheless, Ackerman's argument
served as a reminder that by impeaching the President in a lame duck session the House
arguably had put at risk some of the political (as opposed to constitutional) legitimacy of
its impeachment judgment.
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defining or adopting a uniform standard for defining the impeachability of certain misconduct. In the House, the members
also decided for themselves such questions as the applicability of
the Fifth Amendment due process clause, the appropriate burden of proof, and the propriety of allowing three of their colleagues to cast votes on the articles even though each had been
elected to the Senate and would have the opportunity to sit in
judgment on the President in his impeachment trial. In the latter
proceeding, senators decided for themselves such procedural
questions as the appropriate burden of proof, the applicable
rules of evidence (including the need for live testimony), the appropriate standard for determining the impeachability of the
President's misconduct, and the propriety of holding closed door
hearings on a variety of issues (including the final debates on the
President's guilt or innocence.)
Yet another possible consequence of the Clinton impeachment proceedings is that they could be construed as confirming
there are different standards for impeaching presidents and
judges. An argument made on behalf of the President in the
House and the Senate was that there are different standards for
impeaching presidents and judges based on the officials' different tenure and responsibilities. Judges serve only "during good
Behavior"23 and thus arguably could be removed for misbehavior
that includes but is not necessarily limited to impeachable offenses.24 Moreover, presidents are elected, and thus the electoral
process arguably operates as the primary check against a president's abuse of power. Since a president presumably will return
to private life after his term, he is available in a way a judge will
not be to be held accountable for both civil and criminal misconduct at a time when it will not interfere with his official duties.
Several factors cut against inferring that Congress endorsed
different standards for impeaching different officials from the
President's acquittal. First, the constitutional language is uniform.25 Second, the assertion is counter-historical. It conflicts
with the Founders' obvious intention to adopt the phrase "during good Behavior" to distinguish judicial tenure (life) from the
23. U.S. Const., Art. III,§ 1.
24. For a more elaborate articulation of this argument (and the counter·argument),
see Michael J. Gerhardt, The Federal Impeachment Process: A Constitutional and His·
torica/ Analysis 83-86 (Princeton U. Press, 1996).
25. See U.S. Const., Art. II, § 4 ("The President, Vice-President, and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.").
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tenure of elected officials (such as the President) rather than to
establish the particular terms of judicial removae6 Moreover,
the argument that the Constitution establishes different standards for impeaching presidents and judges was never raised
prior to the latter quarter of the 20th century. (President Johnson, for instance, never made such a claim, though his impeachment had been preceded by four judicial impeachments, including Samuel Chase's.) Third, allowing judges to be removed for
misbehavior that falls short of an impeachable offense undercuts
the constitutional safeguards against political retaliation against
judges for doing their jobs. The constitutional structure ceases
to make much sense if judges may be removed either through
the cumbersome, difficult process of impeachment for impeachable offenses, or an easier, looser process (administered by Congress or by others such as judges) for misbehavior that does not
rise to the level of an impeachable offense. Fourth, the fact that
the consequences that might ensue from an attempt to impeach a
president might be different from those that might result from
the removal of a judge is not a basis for finding different constitutional standards for impeaching presidents and judges. The
consequences of an impeachment are plainly relevant as factors
to be taken into account in the course of applying the operative
standard, but they do not necessarily justify different standards
altogether. In addition, of the 17 senators who expressed an
opinion about this issue in the Clinton impeachment trial, eleven
(ten Republicans and one Democrat) took the position that the
same standard applies for impeaching presidents and federal
judges. 27
Regardless of whether subsequent generations will construe
the Clinton impeachment proceedings as confirming that there
are different standards for impeaching presidents and judges,
they will surely ponder what particular standard, if any, the
Clinton proceedings endorsed for determining the impeachability of the President's misconduct. To be sure, neither the House
nor the Senate formally endorsed a specific standard of impeachment. Instead, it appears that there were almost as many
26. See Gerhardt, The Federal Impeachment Process at 83-84 (cited in note 24).
27. For the senators who publicly supported different standards for impeaching
presidents and judges, see Published Oosed-Door Statements of Senators Biden, Breaux,
Kerry, Kohl, Robb, and Sarbanes (released into the Congressional Record on Feb. 12,
1999). For senators who published statements opposing the latter view, see Published
Statements of Senators Allard, Bond, Brown back, Fitzgerald, Frist, Gorton, Grams, Kerrey, Kyl, Mack, and McConnell (released into the Congressional Record on Feb. 12,
1999).
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standards for determining the impeachability of the President's
misconduct as they were members of both chambers voting on
the articles of impeachment.
Nevertheless, the Clinton impeachment serves as a reminder of the Framers' expectations that Congress would determine on a case-by-case basis the misconduct that constituted
"other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. "28 The constitutional
standard was designed to narrow the range of impeachable offenses from that which was available in England (where there
were no restrictions on the scope of impeachable offenses),29 but
the standard still remains rather broad. The Constitution contemplates that an impeachable offense is a political crime about
whose essential elements the framers disagreed (with the exception of such general preconditions such as serious injury to the
republic). Consequently, every impeachment (including the
most recent one) has featured a debate over whether the misconduct charged constitutes a political crime. As these debates
have shown, it is practically impossible to get the House or the
Senate to adopt a uniform standard for determining the impeachability of misconduct. The resolution of these debates
tracks the historic practice in which each member decides for
himself or herself the proper resolution of a series of procedural
issues. The debates over the proper definition of impeachable
offenses in Congress have thus featured tugs of war in which
those seeking impeachment argue for relatively broad, amorphous standards that they can show have been easily met in a
given case and those opposing impeachment argue for very narrow standards that they claim have not been met in the specific
circumstances of the case before them.
While the debates over the scope of impeachable offenses in
particular cases have not produced consensus among senators
requiring guidelines, the Senate's judgments in impeachment trials do reveal an interesting pattern. The seven federal officials
whom the Senate has convicted and removed from office (all
federal judgeships) have had in common misconduct that (1) has
caused a serious injury to the republic and (2) has had a nexus .
between the official's misconduct and the official's formal duties.30 In assessing the latter, members of Congress have taken
28. U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 4.
29. See generally Hearing before the House Subcommittee on the Constitution of
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 105'' Cong. 46-49
(1999) (statement of Professor Michael J. Gerhardt).
30. See generally id. at 54-56.
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into account the degree to which certain misconduct has been
completely incompatible with or completely disabled an official.
In President Clinton's impeachment trial, several senators explained their acquittal votes on the absence of one or more of
these elements. 31
Yet another possible consequence of President Clinton's
impeachment is that it might have left much of the public with
the impression that impeachment is just another political event.
Indeed, over 70% of the American people believed that the
President's im~achment trial had been resolved largely on partisan grounds. This outcome is not what the Framers wanted.
For instance, in Federalist Number 65, Alexander Hamilton expressed the hope that senators in an impeachment trial would
rise above the passions of the moment to do what is in the best
interests of the Constitution or the nation. 33 Arguably, Johnson's
acquittal is an example of such altruism. In contrast, the Clinton
impeachment proceedings posed a different dynamic from the
one that Hamilton explained the founders had tried to guard
against. The founders were primarily concerned with a circumstance in which the public pressured Congress to remove a
president (and senators resisted), but the Founders did not foresee (nor, at the very least, discuss) a situation in which the public
largely opposed while many members of Congress intensely supported removal. Interestingly, the Senate's failure to convict
President Clinton followed popular sentiment, but it did not win
the respect of the American people. The proceedings generally
34
weakened the public's confidence in Congress.
It is possible that one facet of the Clinton impeachment
proceedings that reduced most people's confidence in government to operate in a neutral manner is the fate of censure. Censure failed for several reasons, including the argument that led
Republican leaders in the House and the Senate to preclude a
separate vote on censure-i.e., the Constitution recognizes only
one means-impeachment-for dealing with a President's misconduct. This argument might have struck many people as dis-

31. See Published Oosed-Door Statements of Senators Oeland, Dorgan, Jeffords,
Johnson, Kerrey, Kohl, Lautenberg, Lieberman, Lincoln, Mikulski, Reid (released into
the Congressional Record on Feb. 12, 1999).
32. See note 19.
33. See Federalist 65 (Hamilton) in Gary Wills, ed., The Federalist Papers 380-81
(Bantam, 1987).
34. See David S. Broder and Dan Baltz, Squabbling Sinks· Views of Congress, The
Arizona Republic (Feb. 13, 1999), available at 1999 WL 4152239.

1999]

BOOK REVIEWS

457

ingenuous (indeed, most Americans supported censure as anal35
ternative to impeachment throughout the proceedings ). First,
the argument that impeachment is the only means for dealing
with a President's misconduct missed the point. The argument
for censure was that it was a legitimate option for dealing with a
president's misconduct that did not rise to the level of an impeachable offense. Impeachment has no bearing whatsoever on
what Congress may do with respect to the latter category of misconduct, for it exists as the exclusive mechanism available to
Congress for removing a president for impeachable misconduct.
Second, the Constitution clearly allows senators individually (by
virtue of the First Amendment and the speech or debate clause)
to announce publicly each's condemnation of a president's misconduct. If the senators may engage in such expression individually, it is not clear why constitutionally they may not do so
collectively. There is also nothing in the Constitution that bars a
senator from getting a list of her colleagues' signatures on a
document castigating the President and then entering that
document into the Congressional Record. A censure is tantamount to the latter action. While one could object that censure
might be either a futile act politically or could be overused to
frustrate or harass a president (or some other official), these are
prudential not constitutional objections. The calculation of
whether a censure is constitutional is separate and distinct from
whether it makes political sense in any given case to use. 36
Lastly, President Clinton's acquittal hardly will qualify as a
personal vindication. During the hearings, less than a handful of
senators published or made public comments that did not include very strong condemnation of the President's misconduct.
Those supporting the President's conviction condemned the
President in the harshest of terms. Even the President's defenders overwhelmingly condemned his behavior. They contended
repeatedly that his acquittal should not be construed as foreclosing other fora in which to hold him accountable for his misconduct. This widespread condemnation of the President is
likely to have some historical if not some constitutional significance. For example, it might confirm that our constitutional system includes many fora in which presidents can be held accountable for their misdeeds, including impeachment, civil
35. See, e.g., ABC Good Morning America (7:00 a.m. ET) (December 22, 1998)
transcript #98122201-jol, available in LEXIS-NEXIS, News Directory, Transcripts.
36. For a more elaborate discussion of censure, see Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutionality of Censure, 33 U. Rich. L. Rev. 33 (1999).
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proceedings, criminal prosecution and trial, public opinion, media scrutiny, and history. As Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested,
the lesson of Justice Chase's acquittal is that impeachment is an
inappropriate mechanism for retaliating against a Supreme
Court justice's (or, for that matter, any federal judge's) official
rulings. The appropriate forum for dealing with a judge's mistakes on the bench is the judicial system, particularly through the
appeals process. One popular lesson drawn from President
Johnson's acquittal is that impeachment is an inappropriate
mechanism for redressing a president's mistaken policy judgments. Appropriate fora for dealing with errors of judgment include the court of public opinion, elections, and the judgment of
history. Similarly, President Clinton's acquittal might signal to
subsequent generations that his misconduct did not have a sufficiently public dimension (nor harm) to warrant his removal from
office. Nevertheless, other fora in which to hold him (or others
who might engage in similar misconduct) accountable include
public opinion, the judgment of history, possibly censure, and
civil and criminal proceedings.
What was true about the impeachment process in the nineteenth century, as explained by Chief Justice Rehnquist in
Grand Inquests, still might be true at the end of the twentieth
century-that impeachment is a special mechanism for dealing
with only certain kinds of misconduct, i.e., the most serious
abuses of uniquely presidential powers, privileges, or trust.
Moreover, foreclosing one fora of presidential accountabilityimpeachment-does not necessarily mean that others, such as
civil and criminal proceedings, the court of public opinion, history, perhaps censure, are unavailable. This is just one of the
many possible lessons that might be drawn from President
Clinton's impeachment and acquittal to be explored in the sequel to Chief Justice Rehnquist's Grand Inquests, regardless of
who writes it.

